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I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 1911, the United States Attorney General filed a “petition for injunction and dissolution of U.S. Steel”1 under the Sherman AntiTrust Act.2 It was a fool’s errand. The suit came less than two decades after
the government’s devastating defeat in another antitrust case, United States
v. E.C. Knight.3 There, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act’s prohibition on “combination[s] . . . in restraint of trade”4 did not reach the simple combination of large sugar manufacturers5—even if the combined entity
controlled 98% of the country’s supply of the underlying product.6 Con-

*
Many thanks to those who offered their thoughts and suggested revisions, including, among others, Professor Cushman, Professor Ortiz, and Professor Nelson.
1. William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62
SMU L. REV. 597, 610 (2009).
2.
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 58 (D.N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S.
417 (1920). The Sherman Act prohibits “combination[s] . . . in restraint of trade” and “combin[ations] . . . to monopolize.” Id. at 58 (quoting the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
3.
United States v. E.C. Knight (Sugar Trust), 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
4. Id. at 6 (quoting the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
5. Id. at 17.
6. Norman R. Williams, Constitutional “Niches”: The Role of Institutional Context in Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1881 (2007).
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gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend that far.7 Yet
the government’s case against U.S. Steel was similar to the case against the
Sugar Trust. It was a large combination of iron and steel manufacturers.8
How, then, could the government have hoped for success?
The answer to this as-yet unresolved question says more about the significance of E.C. Knight, and the Court’s pre-New Deal jurisprudence, than
U.S. Steel itself. Knight has been criticized as “a great victory for laissezfaire conservatism”9—the product of a “massive . . . entry into the socioeconomic scene” by a conservative judiciary bent on preserving the prevailing industrial order against popular discontent.10 It was, some say, just the
beginning. Conventional wisdom holds that, before the New Deal, the Supreme Court was a bastion of activist conservatism—manipulating doctrine
to advance a laissez-faire political and economic agenda.11 Yet the decision
to prosecute U.S. Steel, and the reasons behind it, do not fit into that traditional narrative. To hear the conventionalists tell it, Knight should have
been an important tool in a ready-made arsenal against the enemies of laissez-faire. Yet some contemporaries were not persuaded that the Court was
wielding the Knight doctrine to advance business interests. In fact, many
observers believed that Knight—the would-be shield of capitalism—had
been overruled by 1911. In three respects, observers thought it had been
fundamentally upended.
They were wrong, of course—but the reasons for their mistake are also
significant. Contemporaries thought Knight was overruled because they
thought the case had been wrongly decided. Yet the Court’s purported
blunder was not its failure to hew closely to established doctrine or its willingness to flout it to advance a political agenda. Rather, contemporaries
thought the Court was trying too hard to adopt clear legal rules which were,
as a practical matter, unsustainable.
This realization—that contemporaries did not see the pre-New Deal
Court abusing Knight’s landmark Commerce Clause doctrine—is of more
than historical significance. At present, there is an ongoing project to broadly re-evaluate the pre-New Deal Court’s jurisprudence. This includes its
reading of the Commerce Clause. Where the conventional wisdom saw a
Court warping the Constitution to fit its conservative agenda, some like
UVA Professors Barry Cushman and Charles McCurdy see a Court more
interested in adherence to neutral legal principles than previously acknowl7.
8.
9.

Knight, 156 U.S. at 16-17.
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Steel Trust), 251 U.S. 417, 437 (1920).
ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF
BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, 181 (Harper & Row, 1969) (1960).
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2000).

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

97

edged. This article offers a limited defense of this so-called revisionist
movement against claims that contemporary Court observers did not see
that same principled neutrality. In the course of seeking an explanation for
the decision to prosecute U.S. Steel, it examines the contemporary view of
E.C. Knight and finds evidence that substantiates the “revisionist” reading
of that case.
In short, with historical context, it is not difficult to see why the government might have thought it could succeed against U.S. Steel despite the
holding in E.C. Knight. Yes, the cases were factually similar and Knight
was still good law. But, by 1911, Court observers widely believed Knight
had been overruled for three reasons. First, some misread Knight as a broad
holding that the government could never prosecute manufacturing companies under the Sherman Act. When the Court later upheld a Sherman Act
prosecution of a manufacturer, they believed Knight was dead. Second,
others read Knight as categorically insulating holding companies, like U.S.
Steel, from Sherman Act prosecution. When the Court later permitted prosecution of holding companies, they believed Knight had been repudiated.
Third, two cases decided the year U.S. Steel began led some to believe that
the formalistic, line-drawing approach to the Commerce Clause epitomized
in Knight had fallen to a more pragmatic one. As evidenced by its pleadings, the government accepted this widely held view of Knight and proceeded with the ultimately futile case against the Steel Trust. This is significant. The belief that Knight had been overruled and the underlying assumptions clash with the conventional view that the pre-New Deal Court was a
bastion of conservative activism.
II.

THE UNLIKELY DECISION TO PROSECUTE U.S. STEEL

Perhaps, if viewed in isolation, the decision to prosecute U.S. Steel
does not seem so odd. It was a giant of American industry—once the largest
industrial organization in the world.12 At its formation, the U.S. Steel Corporation enjoyed a capitalization equaling twenty-five percent of the Gross
National Product;13 and at the time the government brought suit, it enjoyed
a fifty percent market share.14 But the government did not make its decision
in a vacuum.

12.
13.
14.

Page, supra note 1, at 598.
Id.
Id. at 601.
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THE SHADOW OF E.C. KNIGHT

Less than two decades before, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case United States v. E.C. Knight. There, the government brought suit
against a combination of sugar refiners, which it alleged violated the Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade.15 While the Court agreed that
the combination represented a “monopoly in manufacture,”16 it held that
Congress’s ability to regulate through the Sherman Act was limited by the
scope of its power over interstate commerce.17 That power did not extend,
the Court reasoned, to “[c]ontracts [and] combinations” to manufacture.18
Only with proof of an “intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce”19 could a combination of manufacturers be held subject to the
Sherman Act. There was no such proof in Knight.20
Knight should have haunted U.S. Steel’s would-be prosecutors. It did
not go by unnoticed. As William Howard Taft reflected in 1914 in The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court:
The effect of the decision in the Knight case upon the popular mind, and indeed upon Congress as well, was to discourage hope that the statute could be used to accomplish
its manifest purpose . . . . So strong was the impression
made by the Knight case that [some] concluded that the
evil must be controlled through State legislation, and not
through a national statute . . . .21
What is more, the decision to prosecute the Sugar Trust was a terrible
blunder. Contemporaries—specifically the legislators who drafted the
Sherman Act—knew full well that such a suit would fail.22 An early version
of the Sherman Act, “entitled ‘A Bill to declare unlawful trusts and combinations in restraint of trade and production,’” aimed to give the government
broad power to “dissolve combinations ‘extending to two or more
States,’”23 but Congress abandoned it.24 Lawmakers, relying on Supreme
15. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1895).
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 12 (“That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the
United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the
police power of the state.”).
18. Id. at 16-17.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
21. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 60
(1914).
22. See Charles McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 323-27 (1979).
23. Id. at 324.
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Court cases “demonstrat[ing] that the federal bench had long maintained [in
defining Congress’s Commerce Clause power] a rigid distinction between
transportation and traffic, on the one hand, and production or manufacturing, on the other,” concluded that the bill went too far.25 A redraft of the bill
abandoned any pretense of regulating combinations of manufacturers—it
was aimed at contracts “destroy[ing] . . . competition by exacting rebates
from carriers and by engaging in questionable marketing practices such as
exclusive-dealing contracts, predatory price discrimination, and agreements
to divide markets.” 26 Chairman George Edmunds of the Judiciary Committee specifically “concluded that the Sugar Trust could not be reached
through the commerce power.”27
Furthermore, the material factual allegations in U.S. Steel were similar
to those lodged against the Sugar Trust. In Knight, the defendant was a
holding company28—a horizontal corporate combination formed through
the acquisition of stock in the major sugar refineries across the country.29 It
enjoyed a national monopoly in the manufacture of sugar,30 and the chief
complaint against the corporation was essentially its size: it enjoyed a
“power to control the manufacture of refined sugar” that was so great as to
be “indispensable” to “a large part of the population of the United States.”31
The trust was not a menace by virtue of any “[c]ontracts to buy, sell, or
exchange goods to be transported among the several states,”32 but solely
because of contracts to combine manufacturing concerns.33 These things
were all basically true in U.S. Steel: the defendant was a holding company
with investments in a number of national manufacturers.34 According to the
Court’s opinion, the government’s chief complaint was once more “that the
size of the corporation, the power it may have, not the exertion of the power, [was] an abhorrence to the law . . . .”35 And compelling evidence of ef24. Id. at 325.
25. Id. at 324.
26. Id. at 325-27.
27. See McCurdy, supra note 22, at 325.
28. Tony Freyer, The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Busiess Structure, and
the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920, 74 IOWA L. REV. 991, 1006
(1989).
29. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895); McCurdy, supra note 22, at
328.
30. Id. at 10-11.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 17.
34. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 437 (1920).
35. Id. at 450. This was admittedly a somewhat uncharitable characterization. Id.
(“The government, therefore, is reduced to the assertion that the size of the corporation, the
power that it may have . . . is an abhorrence to the law . . . .”).
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forts to control the sale or transportation of goods in interstate commerce
was conspicuously scarce.36
This is not to say that the factual case against the Steel Trust was every
bit as weak as the case against the Sugar Trust. But whatever evidentiary
improvements the government thought it enjoyed in the case against U.S.
Steel would not have been enough, alone, to reassure them that Knight was
not a serious obstacle. The government needed evidence that U.S. Steel did
more than just combine manufacturers—it needed proof of an intent to restrain the actual sale or transport of products across state lines.37 In this
regard, the government pled two factual allegations tending to show intent
to restrain interstate commerce—but neither was sufficient to cast aside
anxiety about Knight.
First, William Page argues that the government brought suit partly because of evidence that “executives of American steel manufacturers gathered in a series of social events and meetings that became known as the
Gary dinners.”38 Indeed, the Gary dinners do make an appearance in the
government’s pleadings.39 At these dinners, the executives disclosed the
prices at which their products would be sold as part of a “general under36. Id. at 441 (summarizing the opinion of District Judge Woolley, with which the
Court “concur[red] in the main.” Id. at 442.).
37. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17 (“There was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also TAFT, supra
note 21, at 59 (“But the truth is, as is shown by the above quotation from the opinion of
Chief-Justice Fuller, the case for the Government [against the Sugar Trust] was not well
prepared at the circuit. No direct evidence that the sales of sugar across State lines, and the
control of the business of such sales and of prices, were the chief object of the combination
was submitted to the court.”); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 165 (Random House 1965) (1954); Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the Foundation of Modern
American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 100 (2005).
See U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 437 for a discussion of evidence that U.S. Steel controlled means
of transportation.
38.
Page, supra note 1, at 597.
39. J.M. DICKINSON & HENRY E. COLTON, United States of America v. United States
Steel Corporation and Others. THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: TRIALS, 1600-1926. 238-40
(Gale
2010)
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MMLT?af=RN&ae=Q4200638257&srchtp=a&ste=14
(last visited Dec. 5, 2010). The government did make other price fixing allegations. See,
e.g., id. at 194-200. It is unclear that any of these was any more compelling than the Gary
dinners allegations. From what I can tell, many of the allegations were just conclusory assertions that steel manufacturers fixed production quotas and prices. See, e.g., id. Often, the
pleadings acknowledged that the price agreements were not reduced to writing—and, in
some instances, may have been abandoned. For example, the government alleged that several of the constituent manufacturers met before 1900 to agree to price controls. Id. at 141. But
after 1904, it acknowledged, the “parties . . . may not have acted under said agreements,
nevertheless they have continued to meet and entered into understandings as to the maintenance of prices and the apportionment by sales.” Id.
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standing” 40 that manufacturers would commit themselves to stable prices.
The attendees specifically disclaimed any concrete agreements to maintain
prices, insisting instead that the only obligations were purely a matter of
ethics.41
The Gary dinners, however, likely would not have been enough by
themselves to reassure the government that Knight was not fatal. The illegality of the dinners was hardly clear: they “fell in a gray area [of antitrust
law] between a simple declaration of purpose and an express agreement”
over prices.42 Even when combined with other evidence of price collusion,43
the government should have had reservations. After all, there was a hint of
price controls advanced in Knight as well, and the Court took note of the
government’s allegation that the sugar combination “controlled the price of
sugar.”44 And to the extent the Court’s ultimate opinion in U.S. Steel can
provide some admittedly imperfect insight into how the case against the
Steel Trust appeared at its inception, the dismissiveness with which the
Court treated evidence of price fixing by U.S. Steel suggests that it was not
particularly compelling. The Court ultimately concluded that “it may be”45
that the Gary dinners were violations of the law, but U.S. Steel’s attempts to
persuade competitors to control price instability “were abandoned nine
months before [the] suit was brought.”46 In fact, the Court held that U.S.
Steel’s reliance on mere persuasion through initiatives like the Gary dinners
was evidence that it did not control the market.47
Second, the government pled that the Steel Trust gained control over
railroads, ships, and bridge building companies that consumed steel48—
steps obviously tending to demonstrate an intent to restrain the sale and
transport of goods in interstate commerce. U.S. Steel’s “control over transportation,” the government argued, “g[ave] it a commanding position over
40.
Page, supra note 1, at 603 (quoting U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 159).
41. Id. at 601, 609.
42. Id. at 612.
43. Id. at 611; see also Brief for the United States, at 165, 885, 892, 899, United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) reprinted in The United States of
America, Appellant, v. United States Steel Corporation Et Al., THE MAKING OF MODERN
LAW:
TRIALS,
1600-1926
(Gale
2010)
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MMLT?af=RN&ae=Q4200713925&srchtp=a&ste=14
(last visited Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Steel Government Brief].
44. Knight, 156 U.S. at 4.
45. U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 445.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 444-45 (“The power attained was much greater than that possessed by any
one competitor—it was not greater than that possessed by all of them. Monopoly, therefore,
was not achieved, and competitors had to be persuaded . . . through the social form of dinners . . . .”); see also, Page, supra note 1, at 601 (citing U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 440).
48. DICKINSON & COLTON, supra note 39, at 11-15.
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its competitors” and was a “burden imposed upon competitors.”49 In its
brief to the Supreme Court, the government elaborated that U.S. Steel had
acquired two competing50 railways servicing an important ore-producing
region.51 The government claimed that control of these two lines helped
U.S. Steel “fortify its position of dominance” by restricting the supply of
ore to, and setting high rates for, its competitors.52 The consequence of this
was allegedly an increase in prices.53
It is not at all clear, however, that this was the type of convincing evidence that would have persuaded the government that Knight was not a
serious problem. In its brief, U.S. Steel responded that these two railways
were minimally competitive.54 Indeed, the defendant noted, they were only
competitors at two points.55 The government did not seem to contest that
the railroads were only competitive at two points, responding instead that
the railroads could have easily have been expanded.56 And judging from the
opinion of the Court, the government’s assertions about control over transportation did not leave much of an impression. Justice McKenna’s opinion
says little about U.S. Steel’s control over transportation. In fact, the Court
summarized the opinion of District Judge Woolley, which argued that U.S.
Steel “resorted to none of the brutalities or tyrannies that the cases illustrate
of other combinations. It did not secure freight rebates . . . .”57 The Court
went on to say that it “concur[red] in the main with [the opinion] of Judge
Woolley . . . .”58 Again, while this evidence may have reassured prosecutors
when they decided to take on the powerful Steel Trust, it is difficult to im-

49. Id.
50.
U.S. Steel Government Brief, supra note 43, at 688.
51. Id. at 157-158.
52. Id. at 160.
53. Id. at 166. The government also noted that in “1912 the corporation’s subsidiaries controlled 100 vessels plying on the Great Lakes. After the formation of the corporation,
all of the steamship companies belonging to the various subsidiaries were merged into the
Pittsburgh Steamship Co. . . . .” Id. at 696. It is hard to know what to make of the independent persuasiveness of these claims as evidence of an intent to restrain interstate transportation.
54.
Brief on Behalf of U. S. Steel Corp., Its Dirs. & Subsidiaries, at 11-19, United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 372 (1920) (No. 6214) reprinted in United States of
America, Appellant, vs. United States Steel Corporation et al., Appellees, THE MAKING OF
MODERN
LAW:
TRIALS,
1600-1926
(Gale
2010)
December
6,
2010
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MMLT?af=RN&ae=Q4201361116&srchtp=a&ste=14
(last visited Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Steel Brief].
55. Id. at 343-344.
56.
U.S. Steel Government Brief, supra note 43, at 688 (“Both roads reached Virginia and Biwabik. At these points Gayley admitted the railroads were competitors.”).
57. U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 440-41.
58. Id. at 442.
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agine these improvements alone gave the government confidence that it
could prevail despite Knight.
B.

KNIGHT WAS STILL GOOD LAW

Nor does it appear that any actual change in the law would have
calmed the government’s fears of E.C. Knight. There is little question59 that
it was still, in fact, good law in 1911. As one article explained, “In the period 1897-1911 . . . [t]he distinction between manufacture or production
and trade or commerce, as affirmed in E.C. Knight, remained in effect at all
times.”60
Several cases indicate that Knight was still an important limit on the
scope of the Sherman Act even when U.S. Steel was ultimately decided by
the Court in 1920.61 Just two years later, the Court struck down a Sherman
Act prosecution of a labor union in United Mine Workers of America v.
Coronado Coal Co. There, the Court reasoned that the subject of the prosecution was coal mining—production—and not within the reach of the
commerce power without a demonstrated intent to restrain commerce.62
Again, in 1924’s United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel
Trunk Co., the Court, citing Knight,63 struck down a Sherman Act suit
against a striking leather workers’ union.64 The Court reasoned within
Knight framework, holding that a union’s attempt to obstruct manufacturing
was normally only an “indirect and remote obstruction to . . . commerce”
without the “intent” to “monopolize supply” or “control . . . prices.”65 What
is more, outside the context of the Sherman Act, the manufactur59.
At least one modern observer does argue that the Court quickly retreated from
its holding in Knight. See Williams, supra note 6, at 1882. (“Even at the time, though,
Knight's stated holding was misleadingly broad, as the Court quickly backed down from its
categorical proclamation and began searching for ways to accommodate its formal rule with
the economic reality that much commerce (as the Court understood it) depended on antecedent or subsequent economic activities.”). It is not clear, but McCurdy also seems to imply
that the Court made some adjustments to the Knight approach to antitrust law in 1903 once it
became clear that the states were not adequately regulating abuses of the corporate form. See
also McCurdy, supra note 22, at 308.
60. Martin J. Sklar, Sherman Antitrust Act Jurisprudence and Federal PolicyMaking in the Formative Period, 35 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 791, 800 (1990).
61. See Cushman, supra note 11, at 1097-99.
62.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. 344, 408 (1922).
63.
United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457, 465-69 (1924) (clarifying the status of Knight, the Court said, “The Knight case has
been looked upon by many as qualified by subsequent decisions of this court. The case is to
be sustained only by the view that there was no proof of steps to be taken with intent to
monopolize or restrain interstate commerce in sugar, but only proof of the acquisition of
stock in sugar manufacturing companies to control its making.”).
64. Id. at 471.
65. Id.
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ing/commerce distinction at the heart of Knight was still precedential. In
1918, just two years before the U.S. Steel decision, the Court struck down a
federal child labor law prohibiting the sale in interstate commerce of goods
made with underage labor. Regulating manufacturing remained outside
Congress’s reach: “Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample, but the production of articles, intended
for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”66
Knight’s influence is similarly discernable in the Court’s opinion in
U.S. Steel. There, the Court declined to enforce the Sherman Act against
U.S. Steel.67 Though Knight is not cited, the Court was mindful that evidence of U.S. Steel’s acquisition of significant productive capacity would
not be enough to implicate the Sherman Act without control over the sale of
goods in interstate commerce:
What, then, can now be urged against the corporation? Can
comparisons in other regards be made with its competitors
and by such comparisons guilty or innocent existence be
assigned it? It is greater in size and productive power than
any of its competitors, equal or nearly equal to them all,
but its power over prices was not and is not commensurate
with its power to produce.68
What’s more, two hallmarks of Knight’s holding appear in U.S. Steel.
The Knight Court made clear that manufacturing entities could only be subject to Sherman Act prosecution where they had demonstrated an intent to
restrain interstate commerce beyond mere merger. The Court held that
“[t]here was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint
upon trade or commerce” and that merely acquiring another manufacturer
by “the sale . . . of manufacturing stock,” was not enough.69 Moreover, implicit in the holding was the principle that the sheer size of a manufacturing
entity—even where it controlled nearly all of the national production of a
given product70—did not alone demonstrate that intent. Both principles
played central roles in the 1920 decision. The Court directly refuted the
notion that U.S. Steel had implicated the Sherman Act simply by virtue of
its size: “the law does not make mere size an offense . . . .” 71 Similarly, the
majority opinion of the Court repudiated the claim that the Steel combina-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).
United States v. U.S. Steel, Corp. 251 U.S. 417, 457 (1920).
Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1885).
See Williams, supra note 6.
U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 451.
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tion “[was] unlawful regardless of purpose . . . .”72 It held that, whatever
attempts at price fixing U.S. Steel may have undertaken in the past, there
was no “evidence of an intention to resume them . . . .”73
It is true that some have interpreted,74 and still interpret,75 U.S. Steel as
a decision on the merits rather than a jurisdictional decision about the scope
of Congress’s commerce power. The Court held, Martin Sklar argues, that
U.S. Steel’s behavior did not violate the “rule of reason”—a requirement,
imported from the common law prohibition on restraints of trade into the
Sherman Act, that only unreasonable restraints be punished.76 This is surely
right: the Court plainly considered the reasonableness of U.S. Steel’s behavior.77 But holdings on the merits and on the basis of jurisdiction were not
mutually exclusive under the Sherman Act. The jurisdictional manufacturing/commerce distinction in Knight was folded into the Court’s rule of reason merits analysis. William Letwin, for example, argues that the Court
modified the jurisdictional manufacturing/commerce distinction “to do the
same work accomplished by the common-law distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints.”78 A contemporary writer made the same
observation: “The only standard of what is an undue restraint of trade is that
of reason. This standard is the same as that of the direct and indirect effect
on trade which was laid down in the prior cases.”79 The merger of jurisdictional and substantive elements of the statute is no surprise, as the substantive prohibitions in the Sherman Act expressly turned on the offender’s
72. Id. at 450-51.
73. Id. at 445.
74.
Prather S. McDonald, A Colloquial Upon the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 1 TENN.
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1922-1923); Myron W. Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 815, 815-16 (1921-22).
75. See Sklar, supra note 62, at 814-15.
76. Id. at 791-92, 814-15.
77. See, e.g., U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 445-47, 455-56 (evaluating U.S. Steel’s behavior and implicitly contrasting it with that of Standard Oil and American Tobacco).
78. LETWIN, supra note 37, at 179-80; see also Sklar, supra note 62, at 801-02. I
read Sklar as saying that the jurisdictional manufacturing/commerce was an analog to the
common law distinction between “direct and ancillary restraints” of trade, which was in turn
used as a stand-in for the “rule of reason” in the Court’s jurisprudence.
79.
Harold Evans, The Standard Oil and American Tobacco Cases, 60 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 317 (1911-1912). Evans appears to be using the “direct and indirect restraint of
trade standard” as a proxy for the manufacturing/commerce distinction from Knight. To
support his position, he cites to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
There, the Court quotes from Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898): “There
must be some direct and immediate effect upon on interstate commerce, in order to come
within the [Anti-Trust] act.” In turn, the Court in Hopkins suggests that the direct/indirect
restraint test is, indeed, jurisdictional. It cites Knight to support the proposition that “[a]n
agreement may in a variety of ways affect interstate commerce, just as state legislation may,
and yet, like it, be entirely valid, because the interference produced by the agreement or by
the legislation is not direct.” Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 594 (citing Knight, 156 U.S. at 16).
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entry into interstate commerce: The act prohibited “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states . . . .”80
Furthermore, the Court’s handling of the issue of U.S. Steel’s intent
also reveals Knight’s influence. The Court held that the defendant did not
operate with the intent necessary for prosecution under the Sherman Act.81
Both the jurisdictional and substantive components of the Act required a
showing of the defendant’s intent.82 With respect to jurisdiction, Knight
held that only with proof of “intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce” could a combination of manufacturers implicate Congress’s commerce powers and be subject to the Act.83 With respect to substance, the
Court in Swift v. United States held that “[t]he [Sherman Act] gives this
proceeding against combinations in restraint of commerce among the states
and against attempts to monopolize the same. Intent is almost essential to
such a combination, and is essential to such an attempt.”84 But the way in
which the Court approached the question of intent varies from jurisdiction
to substance. The Court was willing to consider the size of a combination as
probative evidence only of the substantive intent requirement. In Standard
Oil v. United States, where the Court summarily dismissed any jurisdictional objections,85 it held that the defendant’s sheer size was prima facie evidence of culpable intent: “[T]he unification of power and control over petroleum and its products . . . gives rise, in and of itself, in the absence of
countervailing circumstances . . . to the prima facie presumption of intent
and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry . . . .”86 Yet
Knight held that the size of a manufacturing combination is not enough to
establish the intent necessary to furnish jurisdiction.87 And in U.S. Steel the
Court specifically rejected the government’s argument that the defendant’s
size alone was enough to establish liability without any showing of intent.88

80. Knight, 156 U.S. at 22 (quoting the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) (emphasis added).
81. U.S. Steel, 256 U.S. at 445.
82. E.g., United States v. Swift, 196 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1905) (considering both
questions of substance and jurisdiction through the lens of intent).
83. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
84. Swift, 196 U.S. at 396.
85.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911) (rejecting an argument that the holding in Knight forbade the prosecution as “plainly foreclosed” and not
worthy of “express notice”).
86. Id. at 75.
87. In Knight, where the defendant controlled 98% of production, see Williams,
supra note 6, the Court held that there was “nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to
put a restraint upon trade or commerce . . . .” Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
88. U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 450-51.
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This suggests that the Court’s discussion of intent was aimed primarily at
the jurisdictional component of the statute, as there was no clear sign that
U.S. Steel’s size was relevant to its analysis. The jurisdictional rule set out
in Knight thus likely played an important role in deciding the outcome of
U.S. Steel.
As the opinion in U.S. Steel and other contemporary cases demonstrate, Knight was still good law when U.S. Steel began in 1911. That is, the
government brought suit against an enormous combination of steel manufacturers—one that would not end for nearly a decade—in the face of clearly adverse precedent. And so the question remains: how could they have
hoped to win?
III.

CONTEMPORARIES BELIEVED KNIGHT WAS OVERRULED

The answer is that the United States initiated the case against U.S.
Steel in a climate of confusion. The contemporary legal scholarship was full
of bald assertions of Knight’s irrelevance. One writer insisted, “There can
be little doubt that if [E.C. Knight] could come before the Supreme Court as
an original question at the present day, the court would reach a very different decision from that rendered in 1895.”89 Another opined that “[t]he decision in the Sugar Trust case was one of the earliest decisions under the Anti-Trust Act and, in the opinion of the writer, cannot be reconciled with the
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.”90 And still another: “The
Knight case, for all practical purposes, must be held to be overruled . . . .”91
Even the Supreme Court recognized this widespread opinion of Knight:

Id.

The government, therefore, is reduced to the assertion that the
size of the corporation . . . is an abhorrence to the law . . . regardless of purpose . . . .
We have pointed out that there are several of the government’s contentions which are difficult to represent or measure,
and the one we are now considering—that is, the power is “unlawful regardless of purpose”—is another of them. It seems to
us that it has for its ultimate principle and justification that
strength in any producer or seller is a menace to the public interest and illegal, because there is potency in it for mischief.
The regression is extreme, but short of it the government cannot stop. The fallacy it conveys is manifest.

89. Stuart Chevalier, Has the Sugar Trust Case Been Overruled?, 44 AM. L. REV.
858, 858 (1910).
90.
Victor Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act, 10 COLUM. L.
REV. 687, 704 (1910).
91.
Robert L. Raymond, The Federal Anti-Trust Act, 23 HARV. L. REV. 353, 374
(1909-1910).
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The Knight case has been looked upon by many as qualified by subsequent decisions of this court. The case is to be
sustained only by the view that there was no proof of steps
to be taken with intent to monopolize or restrain interstate
commerce in sugar, but only proof of the acquisition of
stock in sugar manufacturing companies to control its making.92
This confusion was based on three fundamental misreadings of Knight and
its relationship with later cases—each of which led to the mistaken belief
that Knight had been overruled.
A.

MISUNDERSTANDING THE MANUFACTURING/COMMERCE
DISTINCTION

To begin, observers were confused as to the breadth of Knight’s exclusion of manufacturers from the Sherman Act’s reach. Knight actually held
that manufacturers who demonstrated an intent to restrain interstate commerce could be held subject to the Sherman Act.93 But many observers believed that Knight completely exempted virtually all manufacturers from
Sherman Act prosecution. For instance, when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the Sugar Trust case, the United States Attorney General “concluded that the federal government had no power whatsoever to
prosecute close corporations94 in the manufacturing sector.”95 After the defeat, “he personally ‘ripped to shreds’ an indictment that a subordinate had
secured against American Tobacco . . . .”96
He was not alone. While some contemporaries did understand the limitations on the Court’s exclusion of manufacturers from Sherman Act regulation, many were confused. One 1903 observer in the Harvard Law Review, for instance, said that while he understood “that the Court [did not go]
so far as to hold that because the [Sugar] Trust was a manufacturing concern, it was not therefore subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, to the extent that it took part in interstate and foreign trade and commerce . . . an
impression to the contrary [enjoyed] considerable popular support.”97
Another author, succumbing to that popular misconception, claimed that
92.
United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457, 468-69 (1924).
93. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
94. As discussed infra Part III.B, there was also confusion about Knight’s bearing
on closely held corporations.
95.
McCurdy, supra note 22, at 330.
96. Id.
97.
Wm. F. Dana, The Supreme Court and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 16 HARV. L.
REV. 178, 181 (1902-1903).

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

109

“[i]n the Sugar Trust case, in 1894, the [C]ourt held in effect that many or
most of the so-called ‘trusts’ at which the act was aimed were not within its
scope, because Congress has no power . . . to regulate agricultural or manufacturing industries . . . .”98
Because of this overly broad understanding of Knight, a subsequent
decision upholding Sherman Act regulation of manufacturing entities gave
the artificial impression that Knight had been fundamentally upended. In
Addyston Pipe v. United States, “manufacturers and vendors of castiron
[sic] pipe, entered into a combination to raise the prices for pipe for [several
states].”99 The Court held that “the direct effect of the agreement or combination [was] to regulate interstate commerce,”100 and the defendant was
engaged in behavior subject to regulation by the Sherman Act.101 One observer, in agreement with others,102 insisted that “[t]he Knight case, for all
practical purposes, must be held to be overruled by the Addyston case.”103
He reasoned that, in the wake of Addyston, the Court accepted the practical
reality that restraint of interstate commerce was the “inevitable result” of
large manufacturing combinations.104
This conclusion was grounded in an overly broad understanding of
Knight. One who realized that Knight’s exclusion of manufacturers from
the scope of the Sherman Act was not total—that manufacturers with a
demonstrated intent to restrain trade could be prosecuted—would not have
attached so much importance to the holding in Addyston Pipe. As the Addyston Court explained, the defendants combined with the “intention” to
98. Edward B. Whitney, Constitutional Questions Under the Federal Anti-Trust
Law, 7 YALE L.J. 285, 285 (1898).
99.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-36 (1899).
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 240.
102.
McDonald, supra note 76, at 4; see also Chevalier, supra note 91, at 871-72. To
the mind of the writer, the last two cases above mentioned are indistinguishable in their
essential facts from that decision. The manufacture and sale of pipes or mantels and the
manufacture and sale of sugar would appear to the ordinary intelligence to be controlled by
the same legal principles.Id.; Whitney, supra note 100, at 285-86 (describing the discrepancy
between the trial court and court of appeals in the Addyston case on whether manufacturers
could be “attacked under this act at all . . . .”).
103. Raymond, supra note 93, at 374.
104. Id.
The Knight Case, for all practical purposes, must be held to be
overruled by the Addyston case. It is impossible for the average mind to distinguish the two. To say that the combination in
the Knight case restrained only manufacture is ignoring not the
“probable intention,” as Judge Peckham called it, on the part
of the manufacturer, but the inevitable result of the manufacture by combination of over ninety per cent of the sugar refined in the whole country.
Id.
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“directly and by means of such combination increase the price for which all
contracts for the delivery of pipe within [the relevant territory] should be
made.”105 In fact, the defendants “filed the affidavits of their managing officers,” wherein they admitted to fixing prices.106 Again, in Knight the
Court held that there was no such intent to restrain the sale of goods
through, for example, price fixing. The failure to recognize these things—
Knight’s holding and the way Addyston Pipe fit within it—led some to believe that Knight had been overruled.
B.

MISREADING KNIGHT AS A CASE ABOUT HOLDING COMPANIES

The misreading of Knight, and its relationship with later cases, did not
stop there. To some, Knight was not significant for what it said about manufacturers. One observer went so far as to say that Knight’s holding had
nothing to do with the Sugar Trust’s status as a manufacturer.107 Rather,
Knight was an important statement about the legality of national corporate
combinations.108 Understanding this view requires some context. Many
105. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 240.
106. Id. at 224.
107. See, e.g., George F. Canfield, Is a Large Corporation an Illegal Combination or
Monopoly Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 95, 108 (1909).
In the Northern Securities case, Mr. Justice Harlan distinguished the Knight case on the ground that “the agreement or
arrangement there involved had reference only to the manufacture or production of sugar.” But this, it is respectfully submitted, is an entirely erroneous view of the Knight case. The
agreement or arrangement involved in that case had nothing to
do with the manufacture of production of sugar. It had to do
with the sales of stock of incorporated companies. These companies, it is true, were engaged in the manufacture and production of sugar, but there is nothing in the opinion of the court to
suggest that the decisions would have been different, if the incorporated companies had been trading companies, instead of
manufacturing companies.
Id.
108. See id. at 108-09.
What the Government sought was that agreements for the sale
of shares of stock, with a view to merging the several sugar refining corporations, should be declared void . . . . This relief
was denied upon the broad ground that the subject-matter involved was the sale of shares of stock, that the contracts for
the sale of shares of stock, although stock of companies engaged in interstate commerce, were not subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, . . . and that the Act did not authorize Congress to compel the surrender of property which had already
passed.
Id.
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Sherman Act observers were confused as to what the Sherman Act actually
forbade. The language of the Act seemed sweepingly categorical, prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce . . . .”109 Could the Act really prohibit every agreement, every
combination, that somehow restrained trade? Did it mean that forming large
corporations, the mere combination of capital, was illegal?110 Some believed not. They insisted the Act’s central prohibition on “restraints of
trade” had a preestablished, and more narrow, common law meaning—
forbidding only contracts “by which a person carrying on a business agrees
with another to abandon or restrict that business.”111 Traditionally falling in
this category were arm’s-length agreements, those “by which a number of
producers combine to reduce competition, either by setting uniform prices,
fixing production quotas, dividing the market into exclusive dealing areas,
or pooling their profits.”112 Not included, it was thought, were combinations
in the form of a new corporation—a new, unified entity.113 The holding
company was among these permitted corporate combinations.114 As one
contemporary scholar suggested, a holding company could not be a conspiracy or combination to restrain trade because it, too, was a unitary entity.115
109. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 58 (D.N.J. 1915) (emphasis added)
(quoting Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See also Raymond, supra note 93, at 376 (“The statute was a piece of trial legislation, a shot into the air;
but it was a shot of sweepingly wide range. Unless given a technical meaning, the words of
the Act are broad and undefined. It was open to the court to give them an exceedingly comprehensive meaning.”).
110. Cf. Raymond, supra note 93, at 375-67.
111. F.C.G., The Merger Case, 17 HARV. L. REV. 474, 476 (1903-1904).
112. LETWIN, supra note 37, at 80.
113. Raymond, supra note 93, at 376. “Until the decision in the Northern Securities
case it was the generally accepted belief among lawyers that . . . a combination in the form
of a corporation was valid under the Act. This belief rested on the well-known principle of
general law that a corporation is an entity.” Id. Canfield, supra note 109, at 101.
A corporation lawfully organized under the laws of a State for
trade or commerce is certainly not a conspiracy. A corporation, it may be conceded, involves a contract of membership
among its stockholders, but such a contract was never regarded
as in any sense a contract in restraint of trade.
Id.
114.
Commentators appear to have understood the holding company as a species of
corporation rather than a loose agreement to restrain trade. Cf. Gilbert Holland Motague, The
Defects of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 19 YALE L.J. 88, 90 (1909-1910); Raymond, supra
note 93, at 376-77 (appearing to say that the defendant in Knight—a holding company—was
of a corporate form rather than a loose agreement).
115. C.C., The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 16 HARV.
L. REV. 539, 545-47 (1902-1903) (discussing the Northern Securities Company, which, as
discussed infra notes 131-139 and accompanying text, was a holding company).
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With that uncertainty in the background, the holding in E.C. Knight, in
combination with 1897’s United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,116
fed an initial impression that the Sherman Act was to adhere to the narrow
common law understanding of restraints of trade—allowing close corporate
combinations, but not arms-length agreements between competitors in restraint of trade. 117 On the one hand, the Court in Knight rejected a Sherman
Act prosecution for formation of a close combination—a holding company.118 This signaled to some that the Act would not, consistent with the
common law, prohibit the mere assembly of corporate entities.119 The Attorney General, for instance, reflected after Knight that “[c]ombinations and
monopolies . . . cannot be reached under [the Sherman Act] merely because
they are combinations and monopolies . . . .”120 On the other hand, in TransMissouri Freight Ass’n, the Court held that an agreement among several
railroads to set “reasonable rates, rules, and regulations” among themselves—traditional common law restraints of trade—“put a restraint upon
trade or commerce as described in the act.” 121 As one writer observed,
The immediate result of [Trans-Missouri] was a rush to
consolidation in every branch of industry. If contracts, associations and loose combinations restraining trade in the
slightest degree were illegal—the corporation lawyers reasoned—then contracts, associations and loose combinations
should be abandoned for consolidation under single ownership in “holding corporations.”122
The belief that Knight, consistent with the common law, excluded corporate mergers from the universe of prohibited restraints of trade was widespread. One author observed that “[m]any, if not most, of the great corporate combinations in the country were formed [after Knight].”123 Indeed, the
rate of corporate mergers in the manufacturing sector rose rapidly in the
immediate wake of Knight.124 Additionally, on the basis of Knight’s pur116.
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
117. See Gilbert Holland Montague, The Defects of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 19
YALE L.J. 88, 89-90 (1909-1910).
118. Freyer, supra note 28, at 1006 (“The Sugar Trust was a holding company
. . . .”).
119. Canfield, supra note 109, at 95-96, 105-08.
120. Montague, supra note 119, at 89.
121. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 292, 341-42.
122. Montague, supra note 119, at 90.
123. Raymond, supra note 93, at 376. The author questions whether Knight actually
held that corporate combinations were legal under the Act, but said that the “generally accepted belief” is that it did. Id. at 376-77.
124. Smythe, supra note 37, at 95.
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ported holding that mere combinations could only indirectly restrain trade,
a 1903 article questioned the soundness of a case deeming a corporate combination illegal.125 Donald Smythe rejects this account, arguing “[t]here is
little, if any, evidence that contemporary observers believed E.C. Knight
would make all mergers immune from antitrust prosecution.”126 He cites to
a Harvard Law Review article and New York Times reporting on E.C.
Knight, which “stated the holding accurately” and “did not subsequently
print any articles that suggested E.C. Knight caused an upswing in merger
activity.”127 But while one law review article and the New York Times may
not have been confused as to the import of Knight’s holding on the legality
of corporate mergers, much of the contemporary legal scholarship did seem
to be.
All of that changed in 1904. In Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act prosecution of a holding
company formed through the merger of two railroad companies.128
The holding, much like Addyston Pipe, helped feed the perception that
E.C. Knight had been fundamentally discredited. Contemporaries believed
that Northern Securities was a complete reversal from what they understood
to be the holding in Knight. Now, mere acquisition by one company of
another’s stock was interstate commerce, regulable under the Sherman Act.
In 1910’s Has the Sugar Trust Case Been Overruled, for example, Stuart
Chevalier asserted that the Northern Securities holding “practically discredit[ed] the Sugar Trust decision.”129 It “expressly decided,” purportedly in
stark contrast to Knight,130 “that the holding by a single corporation of the
stock of two competing railroad companies was commerce within the
meaning of the Act.”131 What is more, mergers were not just subject to
Sherman Act regulation. They were, in the eyes of some, almost flatly illegal. A 1910 writer, for instance, echoed widespread belief that Northern
125. See, e.g., Augustine L. Humes, The Power of Congress Over Combinations, 17
HARV. L. REV. 83, 89-90 (1903-1904) (suggesting that the logic of Knight would compel a
finding that a holding company of railroads represented merely an indirect restraint of trade).
126. Smythe, supra note 37, at 100.
127. Id. at 100-01.
128.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 320-22, 360 (1904).
129.
Chevalier, supra note 91, at 872. Puzzlingly, Chevalier says that the Northern
Securities holding was consistent with the Court’s prior holding in Addyston Pipe, which he
says was a break from Knight. Id. at 871-72. It is not clear what Chevalier believed Addyston
Pipe and Northern Securities had in common, except, maybe, that they took a broader view
of the Commerce Clause power than was taken in Knight.
130. Id. at 873.
131. Id. George Canfield also believed that Knight held that “contracts for the sale of
shares of stock, although stock of companies engaged in interstate commerce, were not
subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, as they affected interstate commerce only indirectly,
and that the Act did not authorize Congress to compel the surrender of property which had
already passed.” Canfield, supra note 109, at 109.
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Securities “outlawed almost every industrial concern of the first importance.”132 Another understood Northern Securities to hold “that this particular form of consolidation of interests,—a holding corporation uniting rival
corporations in such a way as to suppress possible competition between
them,—is in violation of the Federal [A]ntitrust [A]ct . . . .”133 Still another
argued that the “Northern Securities case stands squarely for the proposition
that . . . a holding company formed for the purpose of exchanging stock of
the companies combined is illegal . . . .”134 The development was “in all its
aspects was grave and far-reaching”135 and “worked an entire change in the
law.”136 Much, it seemed, had changed since 1895.
C.

MISTAKING STANDARD OIL AND AMERICAN TOBACCO AS OVERRULING
KNIGHT

In May, 1911, the Supreme Court handed down Standard Oil v. United
States and United States v. American Tobacco Co.—two cases in which the
Court upheld Sherman Act prosecutions of large combinations.137 These
cases, decided just months before the October initiation of U.S. Steel, were
said to clearly repudiate E.C. Knight.138
To some, the cases represented a direct attack on Knight’s characterization of the reach of the commerce power. One observer, who believed the
cases repudiated Knight,139 for instance, understood American Tobacco to
stand for the following: “the mere acquisition of manufacturing plants, at
least by corporations, would appear to be unlawful if the purpose is to mo-

132. Montague, supra note 119, at 110.
133.
Bruce Wyman, The Actual Decision in the Merger Case, 16 GREEN BAG 258,
260 (1904).
134. Raymond, supra note 93, at 374; see also David Walter Brown, The Present
Status of the Northern Securities Decision, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 582 (1907).
The decision was generally interpreted by the Bar and the
business community as asserting the general principle, that the
unification in a single hand of control over two or more active
agencies of inter-state or foreign commerce was, in itself, and
without positive exercise of restraint upon the competition between the acquired agencies, a violation of that act . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
135.
D.H. Chamberlain, The Northern Securities Company Case; A Reply to Professor Langdell, 13 YALE L.J. 57, 57 (1903-1904).
136. Wyman, supra note 135, at 258 (“It seldom happens that an entire change in the
law is worked by force of a single decision.”).
137. American Tobacco was decided on May 29, 1911. 31 S.Ct. 623, 632 (1911).
Standard Oil was decided on May 15, 1911. 221 U.S. 1, 81-82 (1911).
138. Alfred Hayes, What the Sherman Anti-Trust Act Has Accomplished, 47 AM. L.
REV. 697, 698 (1913).
139. Id. at 698.
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nopolize.”140 The Court’s treatment of Knight could not have helped but
promote this understanding. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., the
Court addressed a contention that the tobacco combination was not within
the ambit of the Sherman Act because it was engaged “merely [with] matters of intrastate commerce.”141 The Court refused to consider the jurisdictional Commerce Clause claim because “the want of merit in all the arguments advanced on such subjects is so completely established by the prior
decisions of this court, as pointed out in the Standard Oil Case, as not to
require restatement.”142 In turn, the Standard Oil Court dismissively rejected an argument that the oil trust was not subject to the Sherman Act by
virtue of being merely the manufacturer of interstate commodities:
[A]ll the structure upon which this argument proceeds is
based upon the decision in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.
The view, however, which the argument takes of that case,
and the arguments based upon that view, have been so repeatedly pressed upon this court in connection with the interpretation and enforcement of the anti-trust act, and have
been so necessarily and expressly decided to be unsound,
as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to
require no express notice.143
This was not, however, a repudiation of Knight. The language from
Standard Oil was a direct response to the blanket claim that the Sherman
Act was inapplicable to producers.144 It was intended to reiterate—as
Knight made clear—that the Sherman Act was not categorically inapplicable to all manufacturers, no matter what their intentions. The Standard Oil
Court followed its dismissal of the Knight argument with a string cite to
cases in which defendants were subject to the Sherman Act because they
demonstrated direct ties to interstate commerce or an intent to restrain it.145
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.

Id. at 705-06.
221 U.S. 106, 183-184 (1911)
Id.
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 68-69.
Id. at 68.
[Appellants object that] the act, even if the averments of the
bill be true, cannot be constitutionally applied, because to do
so would extend the powers of Congress to subjects dehors the
reach of its authority to regulate commerce, by enabling that
body to deal with mere questions of production of commodities within the states.

145. Id. at 69 (citing Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197, 320 (1904) (discussing the
prosecution of interstate railroads); Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274, 304-06 (1908) (holding
a union of hat manufacturers subject to Sherman because they attempted to prevent the buy-
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In Knight, the Court conspicuously left open the possibility that manufacturing entities, which demonstrated an intent to restrain commerce, could be
subject to the strictures of the Sherman Act.146
But there are other reasons these cases seemed to abandon Knight. As
a general matter, the holdings in Standard Oil and American Tobacco appeared to represent a wholesale reordering of the Supreme Court’s approach
to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act—a “practically de novo consideration of the
Act . . . .”147 The cases, it was said, finally read a traditional limitation on
the prohibition on restraints of trade into the Sherman Act. At common law,
restraints of trade were only forbidden if they were unreasonable.148 But it
was unclear that this common law tradition informed the meaning of the
Sherman Act. One scholar, for instance, asked, “Does the act by its terms
prohibit any specified conduct, or does it simply induct the federal courts
into a new federal jurisdiction there to operate and obtain results in accordance with the ‘standard of reason which had been applied at common
ing, selling, and transport of the underlying product); Swift, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905) (holding that “the subject-matter is sales, and the very point of the combination is to restrain and
monopolize commerce among the states in respect to such sales”); W. W. Montague & Co.
v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1904) (wherein manufacturers were in an interstate exclusive
dealing contract with dealers in which manufacturers would only sell tile to members of the
association); Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 575-76 (1908) (holding
that a cotton compress company sought to monopolize the compress industry by controlling
the transportation vital to the industry). The Shawnee court stated,
[T]he . . . purpose [was] . . . to place within their power the
control of the compress industry, by purchasing or leasing
those plants which are advantageously located in each of the
hauling districts or territories established by the carriers [railroads] in their cotton tariffs. Within certain boundaries the
haul must be one certain way, and when the Gulf Company
seizes the strategic point, under its leases, competition within
that district is annihilated.
Id. at 435. The Court in Northern Securities appeared to reiterate that manufacturers could
be subject to the Antitrust Act if they do something to “directly or necessarily” restrain
commerce:
[A]lthough the act of Congress known as the anti-trust act has
no reference to the mere manufacture or production of articles
or commodities within the limits of the several states, it does
embrace and declare to be illegal every contract, combination,
or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and
whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states or with foreign nations . . . .
Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 331.
146. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
147. Raymond, supra note 93, at 36 (“In the two great recent cases, the Supreme
Court effectually changed existing law.” Id. at 32); see also McDonald, supra note 76, at 4
(“The Tobacco and Standard Oil cases restored the Sherman Law to its original vitality.”).
148.
Watkins, supra note 76, at 816-17; see also LETWIN, supra note 37, at 79-80.

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

117

law’?”149 Some believed that the Court’s early decisions rejected the notion
that this rule of reason limited the Act’s prohibitions. In A Colloquial Upon
the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, for instance, Prather McDonald reflected that
“[t]he earlier cases had laid down the rule that every restraint of trade,
whether reasonable or not, was made illegal by the Sherman Law.”150
Another observer explained that, in the 1897 case United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass’n, the Court appeared to reject the notion that “the
word ‘unreasonable’ should be interlined by the court, so that the statute
should prohibit only such restraints as should seem to the court or jury unreasonable.”151 All of that changed, however, in 1911. The Court’s opinions
in Standard Oil and American Tobacco seemed to definitively embrace a
rule of reason.152 As one article noted, “The new construction given the
Sherman Act by the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases was grounded, so it
was averred, upon principles of common law.”153 According to another article, eight of the nine Justices in Standard Oil “undertook in a solemn dictum” to resolve the Court’s previous “uncertainty” in favor of the rule of
reason.154 While the Court may have said in American Tobacco that it was
not adopting the rule of reason, some, like Harold Evans, just did not believe it: “The court says, in the Tobacco Case, it did not ‘read the word “unreasonable” into the statute.’ With great deference the writer insists that in
effect it did.”155 This new approach, it seemed, significantly altered the
Court’s earlier understanding of the Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints
of trade.156
149.
Albert M. Kales, The Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. REV. 412, 414 (1917-1918).
150.
McDonald, supra note 76, at 5; but see Herbert Noble, The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and Industrial Combinations, 44 AM. L. REV. 177, 193 (1910) (expressing belief that the
lower federal court decision in American Tobacco was wrong to suggest that the Supreme
Court had not established any limits on the prohibition on restraints of trade); Victor Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 692 (1910).
Although dicta may be found in the opinions of the court
which, taken without regard to the context, might seem to indicate that the court considered that all contracts and combinations restricting competition in any degree were prohibited by
the Anti-Trust Act, no such conclusion can fairly be deduced
from these opinions when considered in their entirety.
Id. at 692; TAFT, supra note 21, at 89-91.
151. Whitney, supra note 100, at 286. Still others recognized this reading of the early
Sherman Act cases but nonetheless disagreed that they actually rejected the Rule of Reason.
See, e.g., TAFT, supra note 21, at 63-64; Morawetz, supra note 152, at 692.
152. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 76, at 4.
153.
Watkins, supra note 76, at 816.
154.
Kales, supra note 151, at 430-32.
155. Raymond, supra note 93, at 41.
156.
Harold Evans, supra note 81, at 316; see also Raymond, supra note 148, at 4142.
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Adoption of the rule of reason signaled a whole new approach to the
Sherman Act—one purportedly grounded in a more realistic understanding
of the prevailing industrial order.157 As one 1913 article explained, the
Court appeared to abandon the categorical and rigid line drawing of the
past:
[In Standard Oil, the Court] re-examined carefully the
whole subject, declining on the one hand to construe the
words of the Act in such a literal way as to include all acts
lessening competition, which would have made the Act
impossible of enforcement, and on the other hand to give
the words such a narrow or technical meaning that the restraint of trade should be applicable only to contracts entered into between competitors. The Act is held to make
unlawful acts of whatever sort the purpose of which is to
bring about the evils of monopoly . . . .158
Instead, the Sherman Act’s prohibitions were to be understood in a far more
practical way. “The decisions, when they came, justified those who believed that the logic of facts was stronger than the logic either of theories or
even of tolerably well settled law . . . .”159 What mattered now was “the
whole course of conduct of the persons and corporations involved.”160 Primarily, this meant the Court assessed the legality of combinations through
an examination of their size161 and record of bad acts. One writer explained
that:

157.
One modern observer, too, claims that Standard Oil “expressly rejected as ‘unsound’ the formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacture.” Bruce Johnsen &
Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive
Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 415 (2004).
158. Hayes, supra note 140, at 701-02; McDonald, supra note 76, at 4 (American
Tobacco and Standard Oil represented a return to the Act’s “original vitality,” in contrast to
the preexisting “literal interpretation.”).
159. Raymond, supra note 93, at 32.
160. Id. at 38.
161.
One article argued that a combination could be held in violation for it sheer size
without serious resort to an examination of its bad acts. Sufficiently great size, it argued,
created a presumption of bad acts. Kales, supra note 151, at 422-23. Another disagreed,
however, saying,
While Chief Justice White indicates that the size of the Standard Oil Company is so vast that it gives rise to the presumption of an intent to monopolize, it would appear to be the view
of the Court that mere size in the absence of wrongful purpose
does not bring a corporation under the Act.
Hayes, supra note 140, at 702.
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Since the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases, it has become
articulate that a combination . . . which, by reason of its
size and preponderant position in the business, has the
power and the purpose, or uses its power to exclude others
from the business by illegal acts and unlawful and unfair
methods of competition, is an attempt at monopoly, and a
restraint of trade and illegal at common law, and, if interstate commerce is involved, under the Sherman Act.162
This sea change represented a direct repudiation of Knight to some because they believed that the new framework had been anticipated by Justice
Harlan’s dissent in E.C. Knight. Harlan rejected the Court’s “rigid, technical, and narrow” understanding of the federal government’s power to deal
with corporate combinations.163 He had a broad view of the commerce
power, saying, “[t]he jurisdiction of the general government extends over
every foot of territory within the United States.”164 As a restraint on Congress’s power to regulate commerce under the Sherman Act, Harlan rejected the Court’s application of the manufacturing/commerce distinction.165 But he seemed to offer another restraint, which would be echoed
decades later in Standard Oil and American Tobacco—the common law
rule of reason. He said that “a partial restraint of trade . . . is tolerated by the
law . . . ‘provided it not be unreasonable . . . .’”166 What’s more, Harlan
placed emphasis on the Sugar Trust’s size as a basis for its illegality under
the Sherman Act.167 According to William Howard Taft, Harlan’s dissent
162.
Albert M. Kales, Good and Bad Trusts, 30 HARV. L. REV. 830, 830-31 (19161917).
163. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 19 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Cushman, supra note 11, at 1094 (contrasting Justice Harlan’s approach with the majority’s).
164. Knight, 156 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 34-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Or. Stream Navigation Co. v. Winsor,
87 U.S. 64 (1873)).
167. Id. at 43-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[I]t is conceded that the object of this combination was to obtain control of the business of making and selling refined sugar
throughout the entire country. Those interested in its operations will be satisfied with nothing less than to have the whole
population of America pay tribute to them . . . . And it is
proved—indeed, is conceded—that that object has been accomplished to the extent that the American Sugar Refining
Company now controls 98 per cent of all the sugar refining
business in the country, and therefore controls the price of that
article everywhere. Now, the mere existence of a combination
having such an object and possessing such extraordinary power is itself, under settled principles of law,—there being no ad-
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“bec[a]me the position of the court” in Standard Oil168—emphasizing the
language from Harlan’s opinion discussing common law limitations on the
prohibition on restraints of trade.169 Puzzlingly though, Taft acknowledges
that Harlan’s concurrence in Standard Oil specifically criticized the Court’s
adoption of the rule of reason as “judicial legislation.”170
D.

THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED KNIGHT HAD BEEN OVERRULED

The government’s arguments against U.S. Steel indicate that it, too,
joined the widespread belief that Knight was overruled. It only cites Knight
twice—in one instance relegated to a footnote171—and in neither instance
does it address the manufacturing/commerce distinction. 172 Instead, the
government uses language from E.C. Knight to argue that a combination
need not achieve “absolute monopoly” to be liable under the Sherman
Act.173
Throughout, the government highlighted U.S. Steel’s size and anticompetitive behavior, not its attempts at restraint of trade and transportation. In a section of its brief titled, “Substance of the Charge,” the government does not allege, at least directly, the Steel Corporation’s restraint of
sale or transportation. Instead, the summary emphasized that U.S. Steel
combined “with the purpose and effect of unduly restricting competition”
and achieved “overwhelming power, unduly restricting competition in the
iron and steel trade as a whole and in practically every important branch . . .
.”174 And in its pleadings and its brief to the Court, the government further
underscored U.S. Steel’s size, control over manufacturing, and anticompetitive behavior.175 Between pages 790 and 873 of its brief, for instance, the
government detailed U.S. Steel’s dominance of a variety of markets in the
manufacturing of steel products.176

Id.

judged case to the contrary in this country,—a direct restraint
of trade in the article for the control of the sales of which in
this country that combination was organized.

168. TAFT, supra note 21, at 91-92 (quoting Justice Harlan’s discussion of the common law’s toleration for some “partial restraint[s] of trade”) (quoting Knight, 156 U.S. at
24); see also McDonald, supra note 76, at 3 (“Mr. Justice Harlan dissented and his dissent
finally became the law in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases.”).
169. See TAFT, supra note 21, at 92-93.
170. Id. at 91.
171.
U.S. Steel Government Brief, supra note 43, at 73 n.1.
172. See id. at 73 n.1, 245.
173. See id. at 245 (quoting Knight, 156 U.S. at 16).
174. Id. at 17-18.
175. See id. at 139, 147, 149, 154, 157, 790-873.
176.
U.S. Steel Government Brief, supra note 43, at 790-873.
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The government also made arguments consistent with each of the three
theories that Knight was overruled. It signaled that it believed there was no
longer a carveout for manufacturers with no demonstrated intent to restrain
sale or transportation. Relying partly on Addyston Pipe, for example, the
brief brazenly declared that “[i]t has never been doubted that combinations
of this type, embracing a dominant proportion of those engaged in a particular industry and formed for the express purpose of suppressing competition . . . are combinations in restraint of trade.”177 At another point, the government said that “[e]very combination which by its necessary effect or
because of the character of the means employed threatens the normal operation of the law of competition . . . is . . . within the purview of the Act.”178
Similarly, the government thought holding companies were now per se illegal: “In three leading cases in this Court,” the brief insisted partly in reliance on Northern Securities and Standard Oil, “the holding company as a
means of combining able competitors has been adjudged illegal.”179 And,
finally, the government seemed comfortable that the Court’s line drawing
tilt had been eclipsed by a general standard of reasonableness: “whether
restriction of competition through voluntary combination is undue depends
primarily upon the extent of the restriction. Without attempting to draw an
exact line, the restriction is certainly due when the combination embraces
units which together occupy a preponderant position.”180
Given all this, it seems the government thought it could prevail against
U.S. Steel because it believed, as did so many others, that Knight had been
effectively overruled—by Addyston Pipe, Northern Securities, or Standard
Oil and American Tobacco. This is not to say that there was nothing else
that helped reinforce the government’s belief that this was a case worth
litigating. As mentioned above, there certainly were some factual differences between the cases against the sugar and steel trusts that could help explain the decision. What’s more, it could not have hurt that the composition
of the Supreme Court had completely changed hands between 1895 and the
initiation of U.S. Steel in 1911.181 And there were doubtless any number of
extrajudicial political or other pressures to prosecute. But the close alignment between the government’s arguments and the widespread beliefs
about Knight, Addyston Pipe, Northern Securities, and Standard Oil is a
strong indication that the United States saw an opening against U.S. Steel
because it also believed Knight had been overruled.
177. Id. at 82.
178. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 213.
180. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
181.
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).

States,

122

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

And this fact is itself revealing. The belief in Knight’s irrelevance, and
the background assumptions permitting that belief, conflict with the traditional narrative attached to the pre-New Deal Court’s jurisprudence.
IV.

THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURT?

The conventional view of Knight is that it gutted the Sherman Act as a
weapon against business interests182 and inaugurated an era of laissez-faire
activism on the Supreme Court. In Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law,
Arnold Paul characterized Knight as “a great victory for laissez-faire conservatism[,]”183 which “seemed to leave little left of the Sherman Act.”184
Further, he said that “[n]umerous scholarly books and articles have been
written on the E.C. Knight case and its deleterious influence on American
constituional history until the late 1930’s.”185 Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky claims that until 1937, “the Court was controlled by conservative
Justices deeply committed to laissez-faire economics and strongly opposed
to government economic regulations. Many federal laws were invalidated
as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power . . . .”186 The Court
purportedly advanced its political agenda behind a cloud of judicial hand
waiving—stockpiling a broad body of rules, which could be opportunistically employed to support its extrajudicial objectives.187
This traditional view of the Court’s pre-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence (as well as its other decisions)188 is subject to reevaluation.
182. McCurdy, supra note 22, at 308 (“[T]he conventional contention [is] that a
Court ‘infused with the spirit of laissez faire’ consciously provided the modern industrial
corporation with ‘a charter of liberty’ [in Knight].”).
183. PAUL, supra note 9, at 181.
184. Id. at 179; see also Paul D. Moreno, “So Long As Our System Shall Exist”:
Myth, History, and the New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 736 (2005)
(“The progressives claimed that the Court had eviscerated the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 by distinguishing ‘manufacture’ from ‘commerce,’ as well as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
effects on interstate commerce, in the 1895 sugar trust case.”).
185. PAUL, supra note 9, at 181 n.66 (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT, ch. i (1934); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES
RIGHTS, 151-56, 189-209 (1936)). Edward Corwin also described Knight as “[t]he initial
case illustrative of the Court’s new [laissez-faire] ideology. . . .” Id. at 151-53.
186.
Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 466 n.116
(2008) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 243
(2d ed. 2002)); see also Cushman, supra note 11, at 1091-92 (quoting exponents of the traditional view that the pre-New Deal Court twisted doctrine to advance their economic agenda).
187. Cushman, supra note 11, at 1091-92 (quoting exponents of the traditional view).
188. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (2001) (“Today, many
scholars are engaged in an effort to legitimize judicial review during the Lochner era on the

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

123

Some modern scholars reject the received wisdom that the Justices’ political conservatism significantly controlled Court doctrine. Charles McCurdy,
for instance, argues: “[T]he conventional contention that a Court ‘infused
with the spirit of laissez faire’ consciously provided the modern industrial
corporation with ‘a charter of libery’ simply cannot be sustained.”189 Rather, the Knight decision was “a last desperate attempt” to preserve states’
power to regulate corporate structure.190 Barry Cushman adds that the
Court’s post-Knight decisions hardly cast the Court as a panel of right-wing
scrooges. Knight ultimately was not a substantial obstacle to Sherman Act
regulation of business interests.191 In fact, the Court used Knight on more
than one occasion to protect labor unions from Sherman Act regulation.192
Cushman explains that the Court’s decisions in this area were, in fact,
grounded in preestablished constitutional principles. “The Knight case and
those that followed it were . . . decided against the backdrop of a well developed dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence . . . .”193 Knight’s declaration of the Court’s “[a]ffirmative Commerce Clause doctrine . . . was the
flip side” of preexisting “dormant Commerce Clause” decisions194 that were
established in the “late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
...
.”195 McCurdy, too, sees a basis for Knight’s manufacturing/commerce distinction in preexisting doctrine.196
While Cushman and McCurdy would not necessarily make such a
claim, broad acceptance of their accounts would have implications for the
ongoing argument about the proper application of the Commerce Clause
today. In the 1995 Supreme Court case United States v. Lopez, the Court
struck down a law as an abuse of Congress’s power over interstate commerce for the first time in sixty years.197 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
for the Court held that there were only “three broad categories of activity
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power[:] . . . the channels
ground that decisions during that era reflected established jurisprudence, and thus were
‘law,’ and not ‘politics.’”).
189. McCurdy, supra note 22, at 308.
190. Id. at 308-09.
191. Cushman, supra note 11, at 1094-95 (quoting GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163, 163 (1997)).
192. Id. at 1097-98.
193. Id. at 1125.
194. Id. at 1126. The affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine defined the limits of
Congress’s power to regulate commerce, whereas the dormant Commerce Clause decisions
defined the limits of states’ power to regulate commerce. See id.
195. Id. at 1101.
196. See McCurdy, supra note 22, at 314 (“[The] rigid distinction between traffic and
the organization of production was, in part, a purely formal deduction from prevailing juridical conceptions of corporate competence.”).
197.
Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 101 (2001) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).

124

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

of interstate commerce[,] . . . the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, .
. . [and] those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce
. . . .”198 But Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, proposed an alternative categorization of the Commerce power: the Knight categories. Rejecting the “sweeping” “substantial effects formula” endorsed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist,199 Justice Thomas urged the Court to “temper [its]
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our
more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of
that Clause.”200 He clarified what the original understanding of the term
“commerce” meant, saying “[a]t the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as
transporting . . . .”201 Justice Thomas continued, noting “[c]ommerce” did
not include “productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.”202
Professor Randy Barnett defends Justice Thomas’s position, and argues that
the Associate Justice’s understanding of the original meaning of the Commerce Clause is correct, and that the Court should utilize that “original
meaning” approach to interpreting the Constitution.203 Standing in Justice
Thomas and Barnett’s way, however, is the prevailing view that the Knight
doctrine was merely an instrument of laissez-faire activism.204 For instance,
Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez argued that the pre-New Deal restrictive
view of the commerce power “complemented the Court’s activism in limiting the enforceable scope of state economic regulation.”205 That “activism,”
Souter explained, sprung from the Court’s preference for laissez-faire economics.206 Cushman and McCurdy’s account, if substantiated, would help
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
(2002).

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
See Barnett, supra note 199, at 101-04, 147.
See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601

This narrow, neoclassical definition of commerce was adopted
by the Court during the latter part of the nineteenth century.
The memory of the political ramifications these opinions had
on the Court, coupled with the economic flaws of the neoclassical worldview that generated this constricted view of “commerce” probably explains the fact that no other Justice joined
Justice Thomas' opinion urging a return to this interpretation
of the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 1666 n.236 (citations omitted).
205. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605.
206. Id. at 606.
The fulcrums of judicial review in [the pre-New Deal Court’s
substantive due process] cases were the notions of liberty and
property characteristic of laissez-faire economics, whereas the

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

125

remove some of this tarnish from the doctrine embraced by Justice Thomas
and Barnett.
In evaluating the revisionists’ account of the pre-New Deal Court, Barry Friedman examines contemporaries’ view of the Court’s decisions.207
Friedman says, “commentators at the time criticized the work of [the Court]
precisely in the terms of the conventional story.”208 Outside observers, who
were “fully aware of [the] jurisprudential antecedents” upon which Lochner-era judges purported to rely,209 criticized the Court for infusing their
decisions with their private political beliefs.210 Friedman stops short of alleging that cynically critical public opinion completely undermines the revisionist claim that the Court’s decisions were grounded in the law.211 He
comes close, however, noting “[i]t is difficult to know what to make of revisionist claims in light of overwhelming contemporary commentary that
outright accused judges of importing biases into the law.”212
Friedman is correct that the views of contemporaries are relevant to
the debate as to whether the pre-New Deal Court was guided by its conservative political leanings or, in the alternative, adherence to relatively
“neutral” legal principles.213 Obviously the popular view of the Court’s
behavior is not determinative of what the Court was actually doing, but it is
helpful. As Friedman notes, contemporaries were likely to be aware of the
preexisting doctrine upon which the Court relied in the pre-New Deal era.214
They were, therefore, less vulnerable to the hindsight bias that cannot help
but obstruct the views of modern scholarship.

Id.

Commerce Clause cases turned on what was ostensibly a
structural limit of federal power, but under each conception of
judicial review the Court’s character for the first third of the
century showed itself in exacting judicial scrutiny of a legislature’s choice of economic ends and of the legislative means selected to reach them.

207.
Friedman, supra note 190, at 1388.
208. Id. at 1403.
209. Id. at 1405.
210. Id. at 1407-08.
211. Id. at 1388 (“Revisionists may well be accurate in their jurisprudential claim
. . . .”).
212.
Friedman, supra note 190, at 1420. Friedman focuses on the Court’s substantive
due process decisions, but he does mention contemporary criticism of Knight as a nod to big
business. Id. at 1424.
213.
This is perhaps an overly-reductive characterization of the revisionist position.
Barry Cushman, for instance, argues that the Court’s formalism was, at some level,
grounded in consequentialism. See Cushman, supra note 11, at 1099. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which existed before Knight, Cushman argues, was cultivated to
advance a “free trade” view of the Commerce Clause—“break[ing] down local barriers to
interstate trade . . . .” See id. at 1101-02.
214.
Friedman, supra note 190, at 1405.
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In large part, however, contemporaries’ belief that Knight had been
overruled is consistent with the revisionist understanding of Knight and its
progeny. It is doubtless true that some observers believed Knight was a
momentous decision, which grievously undermined the Sherman Act. One
1898 article said that “[i]n the Sugar Trust case, in 1894, the court [sic] held
in effect that many or most of the so-called ‘trusts’ at which the act was
aimed were not within its scope . . . .”215 Similarly, a later article opined
that “the practical effect of the decision was to limit narrowly the Sherman
Act, to paralyze the efforts of the Department of Justice, and to defeat the
very purpose of the Sherman Act by stimulating the formation of large
companies when agreements between competitiors were held to be illegal.”216 Ultimately though, the fact that so many believed that Knight was
overruled undermines the traditional view that Knight inaugurated a period
of conservative activism respecting the Commerce Clause and Sherman
Act. That is, many contemporaries did not see the Court opportunistically
calling on the Knight doctrine to shield big business interests from antitrust
regulation.217
Even more notably, the background normative assumptions that fed
the belief that Knight had been overruled also clash with the traditional
narrative. Contentions that Knight had been overruled were rooted in criticism of Knight. But the criticism was not that the Court was playing fast
and loose with doctrine to advance its private agenda. Just the opposite:
Observers sensed that the Court’s approach in Knight and after was too
concerned with adherence to legal rules and insufficiently attentive to reality—and that, eventually, the Court must realize its formalism was unworkable. William Howard Taft, for instance, argued in a 1914 book that the
Court began the process of overruling Knight in 1899’s Addyston Pipe decision.218 Taft tacitly acknowledged that the Knight holding was not drawn
from thin air. In a chapter on “The Sugar Trust Case,” he began by describing a circuit court case preceding Knight—In re Green—which clearly anticipated the rule handed down in Knight.219 There, Taft explained, a
whiskey “distilling company had acquired seventy distilleries in the whole
country [and] had united them for the purpose of controlling the business of
distilling whisky . . . .”220 The court held, however, that “[t]he effort to control the production and manufacture of distillery products by the enlarge215. Whitney, supra note 100, at 285.
216. Hayes, supra note 140, at 698; see also TAFT, supra note 21, at 60; Chevalier,
supra note 92, at 863-64.
217. See generally Friedman, supra note 189; Witney, supra note 100; Hayes, supra
note 140.
218. TAFT, supra note 21, at 70.
219. Id. at 49-53.
220. Id. at 50.
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ment and extension of business was not an attempt to monopolize trade and
commerce in such products within the meaning of the statute . . . .”221 The
problem with Knight, then, was not that it was legally unfounded—but that
it was unrealistic. Taft said the reality that the Sugar Trust was seeking
more than control of manufacturing, that it was seeking “control of the
business of such sales and of prices . . . must have been easily capable of
proof.”222 Taft believed that, “by combining manufacturing plants,” industrial trusts inevitably “monopolized the countrywide trade in the products
made” and were rightly subject to the Sherman Act.223 Beginning with Addyston Pipe, he argued, the Court began to recognize this.224
Like Taft, Stuart Chevalier, author of Has the Sugar Trust Case Been
Overruled?,225 also grounded his belief that Knight had been overruled in
criticism of the decision. That criticism was not that the decision was a
function of the Justices’ callous political impulses, but instead was “a single
careless and ill considered decision of a great court . . . .”226 He stated that
“There could be little doubt that if [Knight] could come before the Supreme
Court as an original question at the present day, the court would reach a
very different decision . . . .”227 Again, the Court’s unsustainable error was
that it was being unrealistic. Chevalier contended that, “[r]eviewing the
case as a whole, it is difficult to see how the court could reach the conclusion that the primary purpose of the combination was to manufacture rather
than to sell.”228 Chevalier argued that, ultimately, Justice Harlan’s Knight
dissent, which was purportedly more pragmatic,229 would become the view
of the Court.230
The theme—that the Court overruled231 Knight because of its impracticality, not the justices’ infidelity to doctrine—reappeared in Victor Morawetz’s The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act. Like Taft, Morawetz

Id.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 52 (quoting In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (1892)).
Id. at 59.
TAFT, supra note 21, at 70.
Id.
Chevalier, supra note 91.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 861.
Mr. Justice Harlan alone dissented, but his opinion will rank as
one of the ablest of his many able deliverances; and in the
mind of the writer it completely answers every argument of the
court. [He recognized] the admitted fact that the purpose of the
gigantic combination was to obtain a more perfect control over
the business of refining and selling sugar in this country . . . .

230.
231.

Chevalier, supra note 91, at 872.
Morawetz, supra note 92, at 704.
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credited the Knight decision as enjoying support in preexisting law.232 The
Court’s approach, however, was too narrow—it failed to take account of
what Morawetz believed was the true purpose of the sugar combination—
“to monopolize interstate commerce . . . .”233 The Court’s failure to think
more expansively in Knight, Morawetz implied, failed to promote “the best
interests of the whole country”234—it would have adverse practical consequences.235
More generally, the notion that Standard Oil and American Tobacco
completely reworked the preexisting Sherman Act framework was the
product of observers’ belief that the Court’s categorical formalism—not just
in Knight, but also in Trans-Missouri and Northern Securities—was an
unsustainable impediment to business interests.236 From Knight to the later
Trans-Missouri and Northern Securities, the Court appeared to swing wildly from immunizing virtually all corporate combinations to invalidating
virtually all corporate combinations.237 What resulted was a significant
“impasse” between “business and law.”238 Knight led to a spurt of “great

232.

Id. at 705.
The Supreme Court appears to have assumed that the constitutional question presented was whether Congress had power to
regulate a manufacturing business, or the acquistion or the use
of property for manufacturing purposes merely because, ultimately, the products of the busines might become the subject
matter of interstate commerce, or because the property might
be used in such a manner as to affect interstate commerce. Undoubtedly the court was right in holding that Congress had not
that power . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 706.
234. Id. at 707.
Such construction and such enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act
. . . would carry out its true intent and purpose and would be
for the best interests of the whole country. A decision following the supposed authority of the Sugar Trust case [however]
. . . . would not be accepted by the people of the United States
as a final solution of the trust problem.
Id. at 707.
235.
McCrudy, too, takes note of legal scholars’ calls for a more “realistic” jurisprudence in the wake of Knight. See McCrudy, supra note 22, at 342.
236. Somewhat relatedly, Victor Morawetz argued that the Court’s narrow approach
in Knight risked provoking a popular backlash, which would yield “socialistic” legislation.
See Morawetz, supra note 92, at 707.
237. Knight was thought to protect all corporate mergers, while the later TransMissouri and Northern Securities decisions were believed to reject a “reasonableness” limitation on the Sherman Act’s prohibitions and hold that all corporate mergers were illegal.
See supra notes 119-139 and accompanying text.
238. See Raymond, supra note 93, at 375.

2010]

MISREADING KNIGHT

129

corporate combinations,”239 but then, the “Northern Securities case struck a
severe blow at the corporate combination.”240 After Northern Securities,
where the Court upheld the Sherman Act prosecution of a railroad holding
company,241 it was “not only possible but probable that every great combination in the country [was] liable to prosecution and dissolution under the
Anti-Trust Act.”242 The Court’s “literal approach,” began with TransMissouri’s apparent rejection of the rule of reason,243 “was ruinous to business.”244 What was needed, then, was a more practical approach—
something between the Scylla and Charybdis of Knight and TransMissouri/Northern Securities. As a 1910 article argued, “The law must
strike not at the principle of combination but at monopoly control”—it must
allow corporate mergers, but not monopolies.245 Standard Oil and American
Tobacco seemed to answer that call. By adopting the traditional, perhaps
more realistic, understanding of prohibitions on restraint of trade, the Court
“free[d] honest business men from their doubt[]” while “leav[ing] malefactors, actual and intending, where they were, in peril of the law.”246 This new
approach appeared far more realistic than the purported formalism of earlier
opinions. As one observer explained: “The decisions, when they came, justified those who believed that the logic of facts was stronger than the logic
either of theories or even tolerably well settled law.”247 The new rule
represented not only a repudiation of Knight,248 but also a rejection of
Trans-Missouri and Northern Securities.249 It ironically ended the threat
posed to business interests by the formalism exemplified by Knight.

239. Id. at 377.
240. Id.
241. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 320-22, 360 (1904).
242. Raymond, supra note 93, at 375.
243. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
244.
McDonald, supra note 76, at 4.
245. Raymond, supra note 93, at 378.
246.
Andrew Alexander Bruce, The Supreme Court and the Standard Oil Case, 73
CENT. L.J. 111, 112 (1911). Bruce says that the Court’s purported embrace of the rule of
reason was “dictum” and that the Court had “not injected the word ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’” into the statute. Id. But, he does say that, in the Standard Oil case, the Court “reaffirmed the law of the past and has merely interpreted the Sherman Act and the ‘restraint of
trade and commerce,’ . . . in accordance with the general acceptation in the past of the meaning of those words and as any sane legislature would have interpreted them . . . .” Id. He
also rejects criticism of Standard Oil’s puported adoption of the rule of reason as unsustainable formalism—merely “the opinion of men who think . . . that human language can always
be definite . . . .” Id.
247. Raymond, supra note 93, at 32.
248. See Johnsen, supra note 1159.
249.
Evans, supra note 81, at 316.
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CONCLUSION

Out of context, the 1911 decision to prosecute U.S. Steel is surprising.
The government should have feared, in the wake of E.C. Knight, that a
combination of manufacturers, like U.S. Steel, was not subject to Sherman
Act regulation without an amply demonstrated intent to restrain interstate
commerce. Knight was still good law. But contemporaries widely believed
Knight had been overruled. Some, reading Knight’s manufacturing/commerce distinction as categorically exempting manufacturers from
prosecution in all circumstances, believed the successful prosecution of
pipe manufacturers in Addyston Pipe signaled Knight’s demise. Others originally read Knight as a statement that holding companies, like the Sugar
Trust and U.S. Steel, were not illegal under the Sherman Act. Northern
Securities, invalidating a holding company under the Sherman Act, appeared to upend Knight. And, finally, the Court’s holdings in Standard Oil
and American Tobacco seemed to completely jettison the preexisting Sherman Act framework and adopt an approach vindicating Justin Harlan’s dissent in Knight. The government, in its pleadings and briefs, echoed these
threads of confusion. To the extent the United States initiated this case with
a hope of winning, it likely did so because it, too, believed Knight overruled.
The fact that so many believed Knight overruled is significant. The
traditional view of Knight and the Court’s subsequent decisions is profoundly cynical. Knight, it is said, is among the first in a line of decisions in
which the Court simply drew from a stockpile of doctrine to rationalize its
efforts to advance a laissez-faire agenda. Yet contemporaries, untainted by
hindsight bias, did not see the Court drawing on Knight to advance a political agenda. In fact, the belief that Knight had been overruled was often
grounded in assumptions antithetical to the traditional view of the pre-New
Deal Court. Contemporaries were anxious to see Knight overruled because
the Court’s stubborn adherence to bright line rules was unrealistic and, in
some ways, bad for business. This observation is consistent with the revisionist account of the pre-New Deal Court—that the Court was, in fact,
guided by relatively neutral legal principles as opposed to advancing its
conservative agenda.

